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Abstract
The conventional model of bank liquidity risk management predicts a negative
relation between the risk free rate and the money multiplier. We extend that
model to reﬂect credit, or loan book, risk. We ﬁnd that credit risk model predicts
a positive correlation between the risk free rate and the money multiplier, other
things constant. In the pre-ﬁnancial crisis period the liquidity risk view ﬁts the data
better whilst in the post-crisis period, the credit risk management model is more
appropriate in explaining the relationship between the money multiplier and the risk
free rate. In addition, the model implies that the money multiplier should increase
with stock market return and decline with its volatility. We provide evidence that
this is indeed the case.
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1. Introduction
The eﬀectiveness of monetary policy depends in part on control over broad money, loosely
speaking the money created by the banking system. However, the central bank has direct
inﬂuence only over narrow money. Consequently, central banks have a keen interest in
understanding the determinants of the (broad) money multiplier (see e.g., Williams (2011)
and Goodhart (2009) for recent, policy-oriented discussions of the multiplier).1
Understanding the money multiplier became especially important following the recent
ﬁnancial crisis. A sharp fall in the multiplier occurred as banks contracted their lending
portfolios and increased their holdings of reserves. That elevated level of reserves holdings
continues eight years after the crisis and provides grounds for suspicion that there may
have been a change in banks’ investment behaviour2.
Figure 1: Structural break in the money multiplier
Our paper suggests that the main purpose of holding reserves has switched from
liquidity management to credit risk management.
To support that contention we model the relation between the money multiplier and
the risk free rate. We extend the conventional liquidity management model proposed
by Orr and Mellon (1961)3. That original model suggested that banks hold reserves
solely for liquidity purposes. The reserves holding then declined with the opportunity
cost reﬂected in the loan interest rate and it increases with the penalty rate which we
model as a premium over the risk free rate. In this framework, an increase in the risk
1The importance of the money multiplier has been debated in a huge literature. Recent contributions
inlcude: Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Freeman and Kydland (2000) and more recently still Abrams
(2011).
2No doubt tighter liquidity guidelines imposed by regulators and other developments mentioned in
Section 2.1 also have an impact.
3See also Selgin (2001).
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free rate makes penalty rates larger and increases the punishment for insuﬃcient reserves
holding. To avoid costly penalties banks hold more reserves. Therefore, the liquidity risk
management model predicts that the money multiplier negatively depends on the risk
free rate.
In this paper we extend that model to introduce a role for solvency considerations;
banks face uncertainty both because liquidity is diﬃcult to forecast but also because their
loan portfolio may perform poorly. Consider the case where banks keep reserves solely
to manage credit risk. We assume that banks maximize proﬁts subject to a solvency
constraint. That means that the probability of being insolvent is not to exceed some
limit. In an economy with a low reserve requirement ratio, the solvency constraint is
binding, and the relation between the risk free investment and risk free rate is negative.
The risk free asset is used to hedge solvency risk. When the return on the safe asset
increases, it allows for increased investment in risky assets without violating the solvency
constraint. This leads to an increase in the money multiplier—the opposite eﬀect to the
case when liquidity concerns are the only issue.
We test the relation between changes in the money multiplier and changes in the T-
bills rate. We ﬁnd that there is a strong negative and signiﬁcant relation in the pre-crisis
period and strong, positive and robust relation in post-crisis period. That is consistent
with our suggestion that liquidity risk was more important for banks before the crisis,
but less important than credit risk after the crisis4. That could be because of continuous
QE—like support for liquidity5 and a simultaneous increase in business risk in the post
crisis period. An interesting implication of the model is that an increase in the target
interest rate for policy is not necessarily deﬂationary as it could be consistent with a
boost to bank lending and hence broad money, other things constant. The model also
predicts that the money multiplier should depend positively on the stock market return
and negatively on stock market volatility. The model seems consistent with the data.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 sets out and extends
the standard model of banks. Here banks face risks from deposit withdrawals and from
solvency concerns. We then focus on two special cases. The ﬁrst when only liquidity risks
are present and the second when only solvency risks are present. The latter version of
the model predicts that the money multiplier should depend positively on the risk free
rate and the stock market return and negatively on stock market volatility. Section 3
4Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix indicate a structural change in the dynamics of at the time of
the crisis: Checkable deposits did not grow much but were rather volatile before the crisis, but started
growing in the post-crisis period.
5For a review of QE measures in OECD countries, see Gambacorta et al. (2014).
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tests the model empirically on the pre- and post-crisis data indicating that solvency was
less of an issue pre-crisis but a dominating factor post-crisis. Section 4 concludes.
2. Model of bank facing liquidity and solvency risks
Constructing a model to formalize the bank’s problem in the face of solvency and liquidity
risks takes a little work. A representative bank starts the period with an amount of
deposits, D, from households (retail deposits). The bank may lend to a productive ﬁrm
who has investment opportunities. It is impossible for the banks (or the ﬁrms) to tell ex
ante how proﬁtable the ﬁrm will be. However, banks do know what the average return
will be on a dollar lent. Let Bc denote a bank’s risky corporate loans portfolio with
average stochastic gross return, Rct .
Whatever the banks do not lend to the corporate sector, is kept in the form of reserves
R = D − Bc. Part of these reserves are needed to meet liquidity demands such as
deposit withdrawal. Let y be the liquidity demand to deposits ratio. That ratio is a
stochastic variable with cumulative distribution function G. If reserves are larger than
the bank’s liquidity needs, the bank can lend the diﬀerence on the interbank market and
earn the risk free rate rf > 0 per unit invested. Otherwise the bank needs to borrow at
rate rf (∆ + 1) where ∆ > 0 is some transaction cost associated with borrowing on the
interbank market. Thus, at the end of the period a representative bank will earn expected
income of Et

max(R− yD, 0)rf +BcRc −min(0, R − yD)

rf +∆

and will face costs
of D. Here we assume that no interest is paid on the deposits.
If there were no other constraints facing the bank, its optimal program would simply
be
max
Bc,R,
Π = E

max(R− yD, 0)rf +BcRc +R−min(0, R− yD)rf (1 + ∆)−D

. (2.1)
We recover the solution to this problem below as a special case of the more general
problem we are setting out in this section. However, in addition to liquidity shocks we
assume that banks manage their balance sheets so that there is also a target probability
for solvency. Speciﬁcally, banks desire to be solvent with probability 1 − α, where α is
the probability of default. Thus, the bank is assumed to respect the following constraint:
Pr

max ((r − y) , 0) rf + (1− r)Rc + r − rf (1 + ∆)max((y − r), 0)− 1

< 0

≤ α.
(2.2)
where we deﬁne r = R/D < 1, the reserve ratio.
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That constraint includes two stochastic variables, Rc, the risky return, and y, the
liquidity shock. Therefore we need to work with a joint distribution function. Let g (y, Rc)
denote the joint density of y and Rc. One can now transform the solvency constraint into
a more convenient mathematical form. We consider 2 cases.
The ﬁrst case is when the liquidity shock is smaller than reserves, y < r. In that case
violation of the solvency (2.2) will occur if (r − y) rf + (1− r)Rc + r − 1 < 0 which may
be rewritten as
Rc < 1 +
(y − r) rf
(1− r)
. (2.3)
As a result, for any realization of the liquidity shock y, one may compute the conditional
probability of default
Pr

Rc < 1 +
(y − r) rf
(1− r)

=
1+AR	
−∞
g (y,Rc) dRc,
where AR (r, y) ≡
(y−r)rf
(1−r)
. And so, the probability of default given that the liquidity shock
is smaller than reserves is
Pr

Rc < 1 +
(y − r) rf
(1− r)
; and y < r

=
r	
0

1+AR	
−∞
g (y, Rc) dRc

 dy. (2.4)
The second case is when the liquidity shock is larger than reserves, y > r. In that case
a similar manipulation shows that the probability of default when the liquidity shock
exceeds reserves is
Pr

Rc < 1 + rf (1 + ∆)
(y − r)
1− r
; and y > r

=
1	
r

1+AR(r,y)(1+∆)	
−∞
g (y, Rc) dRc

 dy.
(2.5)
It follows, then, that the total probability of default is the sum of (2.4) and (2.5), and
the solvency constraint (2.2) may be written as
r
1	
0

1+AR	
−∞
g (y, Rc) dRc

 dy +
1	
r


1+AR(r,y)(1+∆)	
1+AR(r,y)
g (y,Rc) dRc

 dy = α (2.6)
2.1. Liquidity management
In the run up to the ﬁnancial crisis it has become widely accepted that many
ﬁnancial institutions were badly undercapitalized, ﬁnancial regulation too lax and many
institutions too risky as they anticipated bailouts. In this section, we capture these factors
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by ignoring the solvency constraint. So, as noted above, whatever banks do not lend to
the corporate sector, is kept in the form of reserves R = D −Bc. Recall, that if reserves
are larger than the liquidity requirements, the bank can lend on the interbank market
earning the risk free rate rf > 0. Otherwise they need to borrow at rate rf (∆ + 1),
where ∆ > 0. If there are no other constraints facing the bank, its optimal program is a
special case of (2.1) above
max
Bc,R,
Π = E

max(R− yD, 0)rf +BcRc +R−min(0, R− yD)rf (1 + ∆)−D

. (2.7)
Denoting by r the reserve to deposit ratio, the problem (2.7) can be written as
max
r
Π
D
= rf
r	
0
(r − y)dG(y) + (1− r)ERc + r − rf (1 + ∆)
1	
r
(y − r)dG(y)− 1. (2.8)
where dG(y) =
+∞
−∞
g (y, Rc) dRc is marginal density of y.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to the reserve ratio is
∂
∂r
Π
D
= rfG(r)−ERc+1+rf (1 + ∆) (1−G(r)) = rf (1 + ∆)−ERc+1−∆G(r) (2.9)
and an internal solution exists if and only if condition (2.10) is true.
1 > G(r) = 1−
ERc − (1 + rf )
∆
> 0. (2.10)
The left-hand inequality of (2.10) simply implies that the expected return on commercial
loans is higher than the risk free rate. If that condition is violated, there follows, in
eﬀect, a ﬂight to quality where banks do not make commercial loans and instead keep all
assets in the form of reserves. The right-hand inequality means that the risk premium
for commercial lending should be smaller than the penalty premium ∆. If that is not the
case, commercial lending is so proﬁtable that reserves are kept at their minimum level.
It is straightforward to see that when condition (2.10) is satisﬁed, the reserve ratio
increases with the risk free rate and penalty ∆. Therefore, when banks are solely
concerned with liquidity risk management, our model implies a negative relation between
the risk free rate and the money multiplier.
However, in the months after the ﬁnancial crisis there was, arguably, a decline in ∆
due to the adoption of so-called Quantitative Easing (QE) and other liquidity-oriented
policies, notably remuneration of reserves (Williams, 2011). Also, the Fed Funds rate was
reduced almost to zero. Therefore, one should have observed an increase of the money
multiplier. However, the money multiplier did not recover after the crisis. Moreover, one
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can clearly observe a positive relation between the money multiplier and the risk free rate
as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: T-bills rate and M1 money multiplier (right axis)
.
The counterfactual prediction of the model in this time period indicates that a sole
focus on liquidity management issues is misleading. In other words, the simple view of
banking behavior implicit in the traditional liquidity management model, i.e., (2.7), is
missing issues that have become important in practice. Williams (2011) notes
[N]ow banks earn interest on their reserves at the Fed .... This fundamental
change in the nature of reserves is not yet addressed in our textbook models
of money supply and the money multiplier. ...[I]f the interest rate paid on
bank reserves is high enough, then banks no longer feel such a pressing need
to "put those reserves to work." In fact, banks could be happy to hold those
reserves as a risk-free interest-bearing asset, essentially a perfect substitute for
holding a Treasury security. If banks are happy to hold excess reserves as an
interest-bearing asset, then the marginal money multiplier on those reserves
can be close to zero.
In other words, in a world where the Fed pays interest on bank reserves,
traditional theories that tell of a mechanical link between reserves, money
supply, and ultimately inﬂation no longer hold. In particular, the world
changes if the Fed is willing to pay a high enough interest rate on reserves.
In that case, the quantity of reserves held by U.S. banks could be extremely
large and have only small eﬀects on, say, M1, M2, or bank lending.
We suggest that indeed there is a relationship between bank lending and remuneration
of reserves. In particular, if safe assets generate some income that provides some insurance
for risky investments and allows for more lending without compromising solvency.
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The solvency issue in banking sector became more important in the post-ﬁnancial
crisis era. There has been (and will continue to be for a few more years) increasing formal
capital requirements on banks. Moreover, tighter ﬁnancial regulations are accompanying
a political backlash against ﬁnancial bailouts. And, at least in some countries, bailouts
may be less likely in the near future as governments repair public sector balance sheets
following the great recession. Such considerations complicate the analysis of the money
multiplier further.
We now focus on the bank’s problem when the solvency constraint is binding.
2.2. Credit risk management
To isolate the eﬀect of the solvency constraint, we assume that there is certainty as regards
the liquidity shock. If ∆ is zero, and the liquidity needs, y, is known, the constraint (2.6)
specializes to the case where
Pr

Rc < 1−
(r − y) rf
(1− r)

≤ α. (2.11)
The bank’s proﬁt maximisation problem then reduces to
max
r,
E
Π
D
= (r − y)rf + (1− r)ERc + r − 1. (2.12)
It is easy to see that constraint (2.11) is binding if ∂
∂r
E Π
D
< 0, which is equivalent to
ERc > rf + 1.
Now deﬁne the conditional cumulative probability function of risky return by̥y(X) =
X
−∞
g (y, Rc) dRc. Then (2.11) with equality is identical to 1 + rf − (1−y)r
f
(1−r)
= ̥−1y (α) or
(1− r) =
(1− y) rf
(1 + rf)−̥−1y (α)
. (2.13)
It follows that
∂
∂rf
(1− r) = (1− y)
1−̥−1y (α)
1 + rf −̥−1y (α)
2
and the proportion of loans (1− r) increases with rf if and only if
1−̥−1y (α) > 0. (2.14)
Condition (2.14) is satisﬁed if and only if the bank is solvent at Rc = 1. So, in this version
of the bank’s problem, the reserves increase with expected liquidity requirements, but in
both cases (high y and low y) reserves decline in the risk free rate.
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3. Risk free rate and the money multiplier
Our model of pure credit risk management discussed in the previous section predicts that
the money multiplier positively depends on the risk free rate. That is because safe assets
may be used for hedging against risky lending. Ceteris paribus, when the risk free rate
is higher, the cash ﬂow from the safe asset is larger and more risky lending is possible
without violation of the solvency constraint. That simple model predicts that the money
multiplier ought to increase in the risk free interest rate and one would expect an increase
in the money multiplier. Inspecting the data post 2009, there does appear to be some
positive co-movement in the money multiplier and the risk free rate in the USA.
To back up that casual empiricism, we also estimated various econometric models. The
relation between the M1 multiplier and the T-bills rate is positive, signiﬁcant and robust
to model speciﬁcation. Table 1 shows that the M1 multiplier follows a very persistent,
heteroskedastic process and indeed the movement of the money multiplier is positively
related to the movement of the 3 month T-bills rate.
Table 1: Money Multiplier and T-bills rate post-crisis period
Dependent variable M1 multiplier from St. Louis FED database 
Sample: August 2008 - March 2016. 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
intercept 0.154**** 0.095**** 0.126**** 0.152**** 0.081**** 0.064** 
m1(-1) 0.788**** 0.872**** 0.831**** 0.988**** 1.177**** 1.242**** 
T-bills rate  0.105**** 0.0673*** 0.060**** 0.095**** 0.222**** 0.149**** 
m1(-2)    -0.192**** -0.283**** -0.327*** 
T-bils rate(-1)     -0.19**** -0.125*** 
 
Variance equation 
 EGarch(1,0) Garch(0,1) IGarch(1,1) EGarch(1,1) EGarch(1,1) IGarch(1,1) 
C(1) -8.11**** 5.51E-05*** 0.19**** -11.11**** -0.33*** 0.125**** 
C(2) 1.11**** 0.858**** 0.79**** 0.893**** -0.27* 0.875**** 
C(3)    -0.43*** 0.93****  
 
R^2 0.953 0.940 0.948 0.962 0.966 0.965 
Akaike -4.266 -4.417 -4.304 -4.327 -4.707 -4.461 
Schwartz -4.129 -4.279 -4.194 -4.135 -4.487 -4.297 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.113 1.004 1.128 1.4973 2.257 2.165 
Log likelihood 201.2 208.2 202.0 206.0 225.5 211.2 
IGarch: GARCH =  C(1)*RESID(-1)^2 + (1 - C(2))*GARCH(-1) 
EGarch: LOG(GARCH)= C(1)+C(2)* ABS(RESID(-1)/SQRT(GARCH(-1)))+C(3)*log(Garch(-1)) 
Garch(0,1): GARCH = C(1) + C(2)*GARCH(-1) 
 
 
Before performing the regressions reported in Table 1 we checked the M1 multiplier
data and rejected the unit root hypothesis for post crisis period. However, we cannot
reject the unit root hypothesis for the complete sample from 1984 onwards. Consequently,
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we respeciﬁed the model in diﬀerences. So we deﬁne dm1 as the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the
money multiplier and dRF as the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the risk free rate. Table 2 shows that
the relation between the increase in the money multiplier and the increase in the risk
free rate is positive and signiﬁcant and robust to the choice of the model for the residual
process.
Table 2: Change in M1 money multiplier, post-crisis
Dependent variable dm1=m1-m1(-1) change in money  multiplier from St. Louis FED database 
Sample: September 2008 - March 2016. 
Independent 
variables 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
dm1(-1) 0.313**** 0.273**** 0.22**** 0.16** 
dRF  0.22**** 0.311**** 0.257**** 0.138**** 
dRF(-1)   0.115**** 0.222**** 
Variance equation 
 Garch(1,1) EGarch EGarch IGarch 
C(1) 5.97E-05**** -0.455982**** -0.37**** 0.09*** 
C(2) 0.119395**** -0.360230** -0.27** 0.91*** 
C(3) 0.955688**** 0.905524**** 0.92****  
 
R^2 0.573751 0.558075 0.663321 0.711335 
Akaike -4.779488 -4.708687 -4.718693 -4.595104 
Schwartz -4.641529 -4.570728 -4.553142 -4.484737 
Durbin-
Watson 
2.070751 1.993389 1.948641 1.966032 
Log likelihood 222.4667 219.2453 220.7005 213.0772 
IGarch: GARCH =  C(1)*RESID(-1)^2 + (1 - C(2))*GARCH(-1) 
EGarch: LOG(GARCH)= C(1)+C(2)* ABS(RESID(-1)/SQRT(GARCH(-1)))+C(3)*log(Garch(-1)) 
Garch(1,1): GARCH = C(1) + C(2)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(3)*GARCH(-1) 
 
 
3.1. Money multiplier and the stock market
We also investigated the relationship between the money multiplier and stock market
behaviour. We refer to the Merton (1974) model for valuing credit risks where it is shown
that corporate debt holding is equivalent to a risk free investment less a European call
option on common stock. Since banks can diversify their assets we assume that their loan
portfolio can be priced against the stock market index.
Consider (2.11) under the assumption that Rc is lognormally distributed, Rc ∼ LN
(rc, σ2). The proportion of loans will be deﬁned as
(1− r) =
(1− y) rf
(1 + rf )− exp (Φ−1 (α) + rc/σ) σ
(3.1)
where Φ is the normal CDF. Therefore, our model predicts that the money multiplier
increases with stock market returns and declines with stock market volatility.
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We computed market return using S&P250 index and used the VIX data as a proxy
for volatility. The regression results in Table 3 also support the predictions of our model
during the post-crisis time period.
Table 3: M1 multiplier and the stock market- post crisis period
Dependent variable dm1=m1-m1(-1) change in money  multiplier from St. Louis FED database. 
Sample: September  2008 March 2016. 
Independent 
variables 
Model 11 Model 12 
dm1(-1) 0.355**** 0.439**** 
dRF  0.156**** 0.137**** 
dRET(-2)  0.079**** 
dRET(-3) 0.073***  
dVIX(-1) -0.00085** -0.0005*** 
   
 
Variance equation 
 IGarch EGarch (1,2) 
C(1) 0.16**** -7.13**** 
C(2) 0.84**** 2.106**** 
C(3)  -0.102**** 
C(4)  0.360**** 
 
R^2 0.569279 0.559630 
Akaike -4.464011 -4.70 
Schwartz -4.326052 -4.447 
Durbin-
Watson 
2.077776 2.204 
Log likelihood 208.1125 222.2571 
IGarch: GARCH =  C(1)*RESID(-1)^2 + (1 - C(2))*GARCH(-1) 
EGarch(1,2): LOG(GARCH) = C(1) + C(2)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + 
                                          + C(3) LOG(GARCH(-1)) + C(4)*LOG(GARCH(-2)) 
 
3.2. Pre-crisis estimation
We estimated the relation between the money multiplier, the stock market and the risk
free rate in the pre-crisis period beginning in January 1990, when data for VIX become
available, until June 2008. We found that there was a signiﬁcant negative trend in the
M1 multiplier before the crisis. But more importantly, there is a negative, signiﬁcant and
robust relation between the money multiplier and the risk free rate (Table 4). Viewed
through the lens of our model, it appears that in the pre-crisis period credit risk and
the solvency constraint were less important than liquidity risk in inﬂuencing aggregate
bank behaviour. It is tempting to suggest, as we intimated above, that this reﬂects a
presumption of bailouts and lax regulation. In any event, there is a signiﬁcant positive
relation between the money multiplier and the market return and a signiﬁcant negative
relation with the volatility of the stock market.
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Table 4. Money multiplier in pre-crisis period
Dependent variable dm1=m1-m1(-1) change in money  multiplier from St. Louis FED database 
Sample: March 1990 - July 2008. 
Independent 
variables 
Model 13 Model 14  Model 15 
intercept -0.0047**** -0.0043**** -0.0043**** 
dm1(-1) 0.183*** 0.16*** 0.147** 
dm1(-2)  0.12** 0.141** 
dRf(-1) -0.010**** -0.10*** -0.010**** 
dRet(-2) 0.022** 0.025** 0.025** 
dVIX(-1) -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.00067 
 
 Tarch(1,0,1) Tarch(1,0,1) EGarch(1,0) 
C(1) 4.23E-05 4.45E-05 -9.226*** 
C(2) 0.20*** 0.21***  0.422**** 
C(3) 0.59** 0.57***  
    
 
R^2 0.100688 0.115 0.111 
Akaike -6.002251 -6.009857 -5.863674 
Schwartz -5.878846 -5.871026 -5.863674 
Durbin-
Watson 
2.010549 2.017438 1.996340 
Log likelihood 668.2476 670.0842 672.4786 
Tarch(1.0.1): GARCH = C(6) + C(7)*RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) + C(8)*GARCH(-1) 
EGarch(1,0): LOG(GARCH) = C(1) + C(2)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)))  
 
3.3. Filtered regression
We found above that the money multiplier was negatively related to the risk free rate
before the crisis (consistent with the liquidity management version of the model), and
that relationship became positive after the crisis (consistent with credit risk management
version of the model). Now we test our basic hypotheses by HP-ﬁltering the money
multiplier and the 3-month T-bills rate. Then we regress the cyclical component of the
money multiplier on the cyclical component of the T-bills rate.
Table 5. Cyclical regression
Dependent variable: Cyclical component of M1 money multiplier, m1_C 
Independent variable:  Cyclical component of T-bills rate, Rf_C  
 
sample March  1990- July 2008 January  2009-March 2016  
m1_C(-1) 0.7738**** 0.784**** 
Rf_C -0.005*** 0.110*** 
 
Variance equation 
EGarch (1,1)   
C(1) -3.585** -0.252*** 
C(2) 0.385**** -0.342**** 
C(3) 0.636**** 0.936**** 
   
R^2 0.639 0.815 
 
 EGarch(1,1): LOG(GARCH)= C(1)+C(2)* ABS(RESID(-1)/SQRT(GARCH(-1)))+C(3)*log(Garch(-1)) 
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Table 5 shows that the volatility of the risk free rate is signiﬁcant in explaining the
volatility of the money multiplier. As before, the coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant
before the crisis and positive and signiﬁcant after the crisis.
4. Discussion
In this paper we developed a simple model of bank behavior incorporating uncertainty
as regards the proﬁtability of the loan book and liquidity needs. The model appeared to
connect with the US data highlighting a number of interesting results.
First, it predicts that the money multiplier is positively related to stock returns
and negatively to stock volatility. Therefore stock market movements are an important
consideration for monetary policymakers.
Second, the model emphasizing credit risk predicts that the money multiplier increases
with the risk free rate. That is in stark contrast to the typical view based on the
traditional model of liquidity risk management which our model nests. We tested that
result empirically and found evidence of a positive relation between the money multiplier
and the T-bills rate in the post crisis period. We also found that the relation was negative
in the period 1990-2008. We conjecture that after the crisis, the liquidity constraint was
signiﬁcantly relaxed by various QE programmes. At the same time, credit risk became
more important. That may explain the apparent change in the aggregate of banks’ lending
strategies, and therefore in the behaviour of the money multiplier.
If our conclusion is correct, an increase of the target Fed Funds rate, in combination
with QE, may lead to an increase in the money multiplier and may not be followed by
deﬂation.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Distribution of the liquidity shock
It may not only be the behaviour of interest rates that has changed post crisis. The
distribution of the liquidity shock, measured as the change in checkable deposits, has
changed behaviour. Figure 3 shows that for about 12 years before the crisis, the quantity
of checkable deposits was stable. Surely related to QE, it started growing after the crisis.
Figure 3: Checkable deposits, billions of dollars
On Figure 4 we plot the percentage fall in checkable deposits over the previous 12
months conditional on it being positive. It can be seen that deposits have been growing
since 2009 and that may indicate that the probability of a liquidity shock has been rather
low since the crisis.
Figure 4. Liquidity shock (fall in the deposits)
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